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Abstract
This study proposes an approach to linguistic semantics under which the val-
ues of the substantive distinctions in grammar (adjective, proper noun, com-
mon noun, ec.) are not lexically specified on terms, but rather follow from the
application of the rules that combine terms into sentences. At the level of the
term, all substantive elements have the same value, that of "atom" or "non-
decomposable unit", and their denotations (the notions they are associated to
in the conceptual domain) only serve to distinguish them from one another.
The categorical distinctions then emerge from how the syntactic rules manip-
ulate a term's basic atomic vaue. Whether the result is felicitous depends on
what the term denotes in the conceptual domain. With this approach, we show
how we can account for the different categorial values of the expression red
(adjective, as in Mary's favourite car is red, and common noun, as in Mary's
favourite colour is red) with a unified lexical description. The semantic value
of substantive elements in grammar is thus derived, since it emerges from the
application of combinatorial rules. The lexical vocabulary, which in principle
cannot be derived, is thus optimal, since each form can be associated with one
conceptual meaning at the lexical level.
The difference between terms and constructions in natural language constitutes a
natural division between what can and what cannot be explained. Arguably, knowl-
edge about terms does not belong to the domain of explanation, but to the domain
of description. The sound-meaning relations that characterize terms are arbitrary,
and must thus be learned case by case. In contrast, knowledge of constructions re-
quires a more powerful mode of description, since speakers can have judgments
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about a potentia: ly infinite number of form-meaning relations at the level of the
construction. Thi s fact rules out an account of knowledge of constructions by mere
listing, and requi res some sort of rule system. In this paper, we want to show that
the natural divisi on between terms and constructions correlates with two different
types of semantic :s, a hypothesis that clearly defines the line between what linguis-
tic theory can al.d cannot explain in semantics. More specifically, we argue that
aside from the flmctional vocabulary of a language, the meaning associated with
substantive term::-their denotation-lies outside of grammatical inquiry per se.
It belongs to cOliceptual knowledge and could be called "conceptual semantics".
Its function at tl.e lexical level is simply to distinguish terms from one another.
In contrast, the 2 spects of meaning that are relevant to grammar are a function of
syntactic combir ation, so that whether an expression is simple or complex has a
direct consequence for its semantic value. Accordingly, this type of semantics, call
it "logical" or "! rammatical" semantics, belongs to the domain of explanation in
grammatical anaysis because it exists at the level of grammatical constructions.
We argue in this paper that a grammatical theory that makes such a distinction
is in principle m<'re explanatory than one that does not, because complexity is com-
pletely removed from the grammatical lexicon, and assigned where it should be: to
the cognitive dOllain, and, in the grammar, to the level of constructions. What con-
strains the distri1>ution of a substantive term in this theory lies in the capacity to
establish a felici :ous mapping between the denotation of the term in the concep-
tual domain and the meaning of the construction where the term appears. It might
seem, at first, th; It we are simply avoiding many problems of analysis by pushing
them outside of ~rammar and, in so doing, hiding the explanations in the conceptual
domain. Howev( r, our position here is not to deny the importance of the concep-
tual domain for Iinguistic interpretation, but rather to argue that it is wrong from a
theoretical stand >oint to use the distinctions that exist in that domain to distinguish
lexical classes in grammar. 1 In fact, as we shall see, a clearer understanding of how
grammatical meaning interacts with conceptual meaning opens up the possibility
of using gramm: Itical semantics as a means of uncovering the organisation of the
conceptual dome in.
Although the correspondence between terms/constructions and the concep-
tual/logical dom lins can be applied to a wide range of facts in linguistic, in this
paper we concer trate mainly on one specific case, the expression red in English.2
In the first sectio I, we present the case that illustrates the issue in this study and out-
line how we see the relation between the two types of semantics, before outlining
1Borer (2005) takes a similar stance regarding the role of lexical projection in syntactic
theory, and the roll: of the conceptual domain in general in grammar. However, as we discuss
in section 6, her aI proach to syntax and meaning is fundamentally different than the one we
propose here, whe re we argue that IUles of syntax actually create semantic distinctions as
they built structur< .
2We choose to illustrate the issues with red because the distinctions involved are simple
and (we believe) u lcontroversial. The arguments made extend to a multitude of examples.
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the rest of the paper.
1. Two TYPES OF MEANING
Seeing Red
Two distinct types of meaning playa role in the interpretation of red in the sen-
tences in (I) and (2).
(1) a. A red table.
b. A bright red.
(2) a. Mary's favourite car is red.
b. Mary's favourite colour is red.
The first relates to the concept that the expression "evokes", namely a certain range
of frequencies in the visible light spectrum.3 Let us use the label RED to talk about
this notion, and use the term denotation to talk about the relation between the ex-
pression red and this notion. The second concerns the grammatical category of the
expression: whereas red has an adjectival interpretation in the (a) examples, it has
a nominal interpretation in the (b) examples. Grammatical categories are generally
not taken to be truly "semantic" categories, but clearly the syntactic category of red
correlates with its logical status in the sentence. For example, when red is interc
preted as a noun, it is arguably the argument of something else, for example, the
determiner a in (lb) and the verb be in the identity reading (2b); and when it has
an adjectival value in (la) and (2a), it is unequivocally a predicate.4 The syntactic
category value of the term is thus directly correlated with the logical value of the
expression in the sentence.
Our claims is that, of these two types of meaning, only the first-the one
identified by the label RED - is relevant for the definition of the term. On the other
hand,. the syntactic value, the fact that red is used as an adjective in (Ia) and (2a)
and as a noun (common noun in (lb) and proper noun in (2a», is not a descriptive
property of the term red. We argue below that that these values arise from the com-
bination of the term in syntax. But first, let us discuss the relevance of the notion
RED in the definition of the term.
3As an anonymous reviewer has pointed out, it might be more relevant to call the notion
associated with red a precept, rather than a concept.
40ne might argue that because red is a common noun in (lb), it is a predicate and not
an argument, since common nouns denote sets. The goal of this paper is to question the
assumption that the denotation of a term determines its logical value, arguing instead that
type is a function of syntactic combination. In any case, independently of this position, it
remains clear that the adjectival and nominal values of red in (1) are directly correlated with
different logical values: for example, whereas red is definitely a predicate with respect to the
argument table in (1a) - whatever type this termmight be- red is an argument with respect
to the predicate bright in (1b). No matter how one wants to formalize the issue, it remains
true that the difference between adjectives and common nouns correlates with logical value
since it is always the common nouns that are arguments of adjectives, andnever the opposite.
:~i~.'
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Our hypothe ;is is that the function of RED in the lexicon is to allow the identi-
fication of the tef n red as an atom, that is, an indivisible entity. To put it differently,
our claim is that the grammatical meaning of a term is not its Saussurean signifie,
but rather the fac. of being a sign: being an indivisible object in a grammatical ex-
pression has a m<:aning. The indivisibility of the term can be defined at two levels:
first, with respec: to the term's status in the expression (the smallest meaningful
unit); and second, at the level of the association between the form !Jed/ and the
notion RED. Vnd ~rthis view, then, the significance of RED for the definition of red
does not lie in tho~details of RED itself-its signifie, a property of the visual field
related to a certa in value of the light spectrum - but in the fact that the expres-
sion red always denotes this reality in context: this is how speakers know that the
expression red is what it is. We assume that the notion RED exists outside of gram-
mar, in the cogni ive domain, and that details about this notion have no bearing on
the value of the e {pression red in the grammar.5 In other words, red behaves in the
grammar as an at' )m, a unit whose internal content is not accessible. All substantive
terms, we argue, are such indivisible entities with this same grammatical value of
atom. Their dene tation at the lexical level serves only to distinguish the different
atoms from one ~nother.
The denotati on of terms only becomes relevant to linguistic meaning at the
level of construction, when terms have been combined in a sentence. In the lexicon,
substantive terms denote different kinds of notions in the conceptual domains, e.g.,
individuals, prop ~rties, categories, substances, etc. The use of substantive terms in
sentences depencs on the capacity of the grammatical system to relate the notion
of atom with the notion denoted by a term. For example, in section 4, we argue
that proper noun!, are bare terms because individuals, in the cognitive domain, can
be understood as atomic entities: just like a grammatical atom, they are indivisible,
unique and autor omous. Given this, a term in its bare state is sufficient to identify
an individual, anI bare terms like Mary, Peter, Sue, etc. can all be used to refer to
individuals in a grammatical context. In contrast, the atomic value of a term cannot
relate to a denota:ion that corresponds to the notion of category, because a category
is a set of things. The grammatical system must thus alter the atomic value of the
term, for exampl~ by combining it with a determiner (a cat) or the plural (cats).6
Once the atom is combined with another expression, it belongs to an object that is
no longer atomic. it can thus receive other values through syntactic combination.
A truth-valw~, under this view, is obtained when the value a given term acquires
in a grammatical context can be associated with some well-formed state of affairs
in the conceptua domain (the reality denoted by the expression). Clearly, the de-
notation of a ten fl is bound to constrain its use in contexts (if something denotes
5In this we agr ~ewith Borer (2005), who also argues that the denotation of substantive
terms plays no role in the grammar.
6This view of bare plurals fits nicely with Carlson's (1980) hypothesis that they are
names of kinds.
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a property, it might be more difficult to use it to refer to an individual, a category,
etc.). However, this is not an absolute, as the case of red above shows. An important
issue then, for this theory as for any other, will be to determine how denotation in-
teracts with grammatical representation to yield truth-value. We will say a bit more
about this important issue below, but full resolution of this question is beyond the
scope of this paper. The main goal here is first to explore the reasons behind this
view of semantics, and second to argue that it leads in principle to a more explana-
tory theory of grammar. The reason, we believe, is because it keeps the complexity
of the cognitive domain outside of the grammatical lexicon and assumes that the
complexity within grammar is in the one area where is it necessary in any case,
namely, in the domain of syntactic combination.
We first argue (section 2) that under the most basic axioms of linguistic the-
ory, a descriptive feature of a term should be constant across all uses of the term.
We then show (section 3) that under this requirement, what defines the term red
is simply the association between the form h£d/ and a notion RED, which exists
outside of grammar: this association defines the notion of atom. In contrast, the
syntactic category value of the term cannot be a terminal property of red because
it is not constant. We outline an approach under which syntactic category value is
the outcome of the manipulation of the notion of atom through syntactic combi-
nation (section 4), and then discuss how these constructed categories interact with
conceptual information to yield truth-values (section 5). Finally, we look at differ-
ences between the proposed approach and other functional and formal frameworks
(section 6), and argue that our analysis is in principle more explanatory because it
minimizes the content of the terminal level of description.
2. FORM AND MEANING CORRESPONDENCE IN LINGUISTIC DESCRIPTION
Unlike form (sounds or signs), meaning has no concrete reality. Determining the ac-
tual nature of meaning is thus in itself a difficult task. As we have argued elsewhere
(Lamarche 1998), the most basic axioms of linguistic theory provide a criterion for
determining whether a meaning property can be associated with a given form. In
short, if a property is specific to a construction (i.e., it is true only of a construction),
then it cannot be associated with any part of that construction. The corollary of this
constraint is that for a meaning property to be associated with an expression, it must
be a property of all the constructions where the expression appears. Although this
might appear to be too strong a position, in that it could lead to the postulation of
empty content for a term, we argue that this is not the case: there must be some-
thing constant about an expression if it is to be recognized as an expression at all.
However, what is constant with substantive expressions is not the details of their
content, but the fact that the same content is always evoked in all contexts where
the terms are used. Let us look more closely at the claim that a description must be
constant.
Minimally, a linguistif: expression, whether simple or complex, is an associa-
1> Yo". ,".,
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tion between a form and a meaning. Describing linguistic expressions thus consists
in establishing an association between a meaning and a form, for each expression
of a language. At a certain level, these form-meaning relations are arbitrary, which
implies that they Inust be learned case by case by speakers. But the theory must also
be able to accour t for the creative nature of linguistic knowledge. Since speakers
have the capacity to produce and understand an infinite number of expressions of
their language, aJI adequate account of linguistic knowledge must also include a
system of rules th at generates complex expressions. Given that the means available
to speakers are fillite (language knowledge must somehow fit in a finite space, the
brain), it seems it evitable that an adequate theoretical account of linguistic knowl-
edge must make l! distinction between two components in a grammar: a finite list of
terminal expressi' ms (a lexicon) and a recursive system that combines expressions
to create more co nplex expressions (a morpho-syntax).?
Under these' )asic axioms, the lexicon is essentially a list of form-meaning as-
sociations that, given their arbitrary nature, must be learned. Clearly, lexicons in
contemporary lin ~uistic theory tend to include more than a simple list of terminal
form- meaning reI ations. For example, the subcategorization frames and selectional
restrictions introcuced in Chomsky (1965) are not, strictly speaking, about termi-
nal information; t ley refer to information about the context where the term appears.
Construction Grammar (Croft, 2001; Fillmore and Kay, 1993; Goldberg, 1995) as-
sumes that chunl:s of syntax are directly listed in the lexicon. In the Generative
Lexicon of Pustej ovsky (1995), the lexicon is seen as a system of rules, a hypothe-
sis that effectivel~' contradicts the idea that the lexicon is the place for non-derivable
facts about langu Ige.
Regardless 0' where, exactly, one wants to divide the syntactic from the lexical,
the fact remains t lat there must be a terminal level of analysis at some point, a level
where arbitrary f,)fm-meaning relations are listed. The importance of this level to
the theory is not .0 be underestimated: statements made at the terminal level have
an inherent cost t ecause they cannot be derived. The more one assumes to be at the
terminal level, th ~greater the cost for the theory. In contrast, semantic properties
of constructed ex pressions should in principle be derivable, and thus explained as
much as possible, because there are an infinite number of form-meaning relations at
the level of the c( nstruction. This makes an account of knowledge of constructions
by listing theoret cally impossible.8
The architec me of the theory implies a natural order. Given that the terminal
level is the basic level of the theory, the one that is required in the construction of
7None of this i::new, of course. Wemerely restate here some relatively uncontroversial
axioms of linguistit: theory that are generally agreed on in contemporary linguistic analysis.
8This does not preclude the listing of certain constructions (for example idioms) in the
lexicon. The expre ;sions we discuss in this paper are not idioms; notice, however, that if
our approach is co rect, it suggests that the notion of idiom itself should be reconsidered,
since the traditiona view of the meaning of terms turns out to be quite different than what is
usually assumed.
100
LAMARCHE Seeing Red
complex expressions, the starting point of any analysis should be to establish the
nature of the form-meaning relations at that level. This task turns out to be chal-
lenging, however, because terms are rarely used in isolation. More often than not,
they are presented to us "packaged" in sentences (that is, in complex expressions).
Thus, whereas the task is to determine what meaning is associated with a given ter~
minal form, what is generally observed is meanings associated with constructions
that include that form.
The axioms of the model, if strictly followed, provide a solution. Under these
axioms, the goal is to associate a terminal form with a terminal meaning and ensure
that there is no mismatch: for example, we would not want to associate a form that
is about a complex expression to what we assume is the meaning of a term (e.g., the
form /n:dka.I! would not be the form associated with the notion RED). Conversely,
a meaning that characterizes a complex form would not be associated with a form
that is assumed to be terminal (RED CAR would not be the meaning associated with
the form !Jrd/).If we take this reasoning to its logical conclusion, we must conclude
that if a meaning is only associated with a complex form, then it should never be
associated with a term. The corollary is that a property associated with a given term
must appear in every complex expression that includes that term. In other words,
what is terminal is a relation between a form and a meaning that is constant across
all constructions, Le., independent of context.
Our research program is based on taking this basic axiom of linguistic the-
ory - that the properties of a term should be constant across all contexts where the
term appears-and letting it determine what is a possible description for terms.
Considering the constructions with red in (1) and (2), we can conclude that syn-
tactic category value is not a terminal property of red, since the term has different
values depending on the context. This raises the question of where syntactic cate-
gory value comes from, if it is not a property of the term. We return to this question
in section 4, but first we must ask: under the assumption that a terminal description
is constant, what is terminal with the expression red? In the next section, we argue
that what is terminal with red is the systematic association between its form and
a reality in the conceptual domain. This unbreakable association, we argue, is the
source of the meaning of the expression in the grammar, namely, its value "atom".
3. CONCEPTUAL SEMANTICS AND TERMINAL DESCRIPTION
The most salient notion that can be associated with the expression red relates to a
range of frequencies in the visible light spectrum, which we refer to as the notion
RED. Under the assumption that a terminal property is a constant property, it be-
comes clear that the intrinsic properties that define this concept have no bearing on
the definition of the term, since it is impossible to find a constant value for RED
that would be true of all contexts in which the expression red appears. The notion
RED is "fuzzy", and has no clear boundaries. There is a range of reds, with bor-
derline cases where one might doubt whether the colour identified is a red or not.
P,"
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This makes it irr possible, by definition, to find a constant content in the domain
where this range is defined.9 Furthermore, the notion is easily subject to contextual
modulation. For ~xample, depending on the nature of the noun that red modifies,
it is possible thai the colour referred to by red in context is closer to a value that
would otherwise be associated with a different colour. To illustrate this, consider
the cases in (3).
(3) a. My sun ;creendid not do the job. My skin is red.
b. He has 'edhair.
The colour of sUilburned "white" skin is often closer to pink than to red, and red
hair often refers to a colour that is more typically in the range of brown. This shows
that the range 01 colour that can be identified by the term red is something that
might lie outside the range defined by the notion.
This appear~ to lead us to a dead end: our approach states that if a property of
meaning is to be associated with a term, this property must be constant across all
contexts where t1,e term appears. But in a simple case, such as the term red, the ba-
sic notion that intuitively seems to define the term (a certain focal value in the visual
field) does not ap pear to be constant; it can be modulated depending on the context,
to a point where. t corresponds to a value that could be called something else. How
are we to reconci Ie the descriptive goal of our methodological assumption (a termi-
nal property is c( nstant across all contexts) with the fact that no constant value can
be isolated in a c lse such as (3)?
Following Ollrcriteria means, quite simply, that the details of the description of
the notion cannol be relevant for the terminal description of the term. Although we
cannot precisely define the notion RED, we can show that the association between
the form red and the notion RED is constant. To know that we are taking about the
expression red, tllere must be an evocation of the notion RED.
In the most, lbvious case, the evocation of the notion is quite straightforward.
Thus, if red is m ed to talk about an object that is truly red, or about the notion of
"redness" itself, then the relation between the term and the notion in the context
poses no problen. In many cases, the relation is not so direct, and it is in these
cases that contex :ual modulation occurs. Consider for example the case of red skin
in (3a). Skin colour in white people is generally a sort of beige-pink (white being
itself modulated in talking about skin colour). When white skin is sunburned, the
colour tends to\" ard a deeper pink, thus closer to red. Given the colour of skin,
red skin evokes a colour of skin that is closer to the concept RED than is "normal"
for skin. Note tt at although red skin is not actually "red", nevertheless one can
only use "red" f( ,r "white" skin when the change from normal is towards redness.
9For this reason, colours are often described in terms of a centrality condition, where
a given colour is understood as a focal value, which gradually fades towards less and less
central values. FOI relevant discussions of this and related issues, see Jackendoff (1983,
ch. 7-8), and Lako:f (1987, ch. 2).
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Consider, for example, that one would not use red to talk about the colour of the
skin of someone with stomach flu, because in this case, the change from normal
skin colour is not towards redness (Are you sick? You look green!). Thus, even if
red does not necessarily denote the actual range of colours labelled RED in this
context, it must nevertheless evoke this notion if it is to be used to talk about skin. 10
The evocation can be even more remote, as in the case of metonymy. Consider
for example the sentence in (4).
(4) This city is red.
In such a sentence, red is used to identify a political association. This follows from
the fact that parties in many political systems are associated with specific colours.
Given this association, the term is then used to express that the citizens of the city
voted for the party that is associated with the red colour.l1 This type of extension
is symbolically encoded in other "metaphorical" uses of the expression. In Western
culture, red is often used as the colour that symbolizes danger (in road signs for
example). We can speculate that this symbolic association gives rise to expressions
like red alert. In another example, the Oxford dictionary claims that the use of red
in the domain of finance (the company is in the red) has its origin in the convention
of using red ink to indicate debts in a ledger.
We thus see that each time the term red is used, there is an evocation of the
notion RED. In contexts where the object that is said to be red is truly red, then the
evocation is direct: but if the object is not really red, then it will imply that there is
something about the object which, in comparison to the domain of knowledge that
is defined by this object, will justify the evocation of the concept RED.12
Perhaps the most direct evidence for the conclusion that what is significant for
red in grammar is not the definition of the notion RED but rather the association
with the notion, comes from cases where the presence of the form !lEd/ in an expres-
sion cannot be associated with the notion RED in any obvious way. If this occurs,
then the conclusion must be that the expression does not contain the term red. The
form is either just the same sequence of sounds as a subpart of another expression
(as in readily) or it characterizes another expression of the language (for example,
the verb read in the past tense, which has the form !lEd/). For an object to be quali-
fied as red by a speaker, there must be some association with the notion RED even
10Contextuaimodification might also be dependant on a specific situation. As Bouchard
(2002) points out, a white house that has a red door might not qualify as 'a red house':
however, in a situation where this house is located in a row with six other houses that are all
white, then it could be referred to as the red house.
IISuch uses are also clearly modulated by cultural knowledge. For example, red in
Canada is nowadays mostly associated with the political mainstream party called the Lib-
erals; but it other cultures, it is often associated with the communist wings of the political
spectrum.
12Theform-meaning relation is also present in morphologically complex words like red-
dish, redder; reddening.
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if it is not obviou s. Imagine, for example, witnessing the following situation: Mary
asks a co-workel to give her the red file, and the co-worker responds by handing
Mary a white follier. If you have no idea what the red file is, you would still assume
that there is a rel<tion with the notion RED. If an appropriate context is provided-
for example, the j He is about the specifications for a new colour in a paint company,
it contains a red llert protocol, its contents used to be in a red folder, etc. - then
the relation to re 1. becomes obvious. This provides further confirmation that it is
the association ~ ith RED that is significant, and not the definition of RED.
Let us assUI le, then, that the notion RED exists somewhere in a domain of
knowledge outsi( Ie of grammatical knowledge (general cognition or world knowl-
edge). This notioll is "fuzzy", and likely impossible to unequivocally define. What
is significant for :he definition of red in English is that the form hr.d/ is systemati-
cally associated, {ith the notion RED. Each time the term red is used in context, an
evocation of the Ilotion RED will need to be found. Otherwise, the sentence will not
contain the expre ssion red.
We should p ~rhaps clarify our position regarding the different uses of red. We
are not claiming that there is a more central, grammatically relevant, meaning for
red (its literal meaning), which is to be contrasted to some less central meaning (or
metaphorical me;ming), which is somehow derived from the central meaning. Our
position is that th ~notion RED is always defined outside of grammar, and the ques-
tion of metaphori cal versus non-metaphorical reading is a question of "proximity'"
to the notion in tile context of use. Thus, a reading is more metaphorical if the no-
tion evoked by t!Ie term is not directly or obviously accessible in the immediate
context of use: s' )me association to the notion must be found given the nature of
the other terms cJmbined with red (more specifically, the notions associated with
these terms). As 1ar as grammar is concerned, the notion remains the same: a notion
that is identified ~omewhere in cognition, relating to a perception in the visual field.
And if the term used is red, then the notion is necessarily evoked in the context.
Consider tht classical example of reference transfer in (5) (Jackendoff 1997,
ex. 6, p. 54; orig inally attributed to Nunberg, 1979) as an illustration of what we
mean by this.
(5) WaiterA talking to Waiter B:
The ham salldwich in the comer wants some more coffee.
In this context, t1e ham sandwich is used to talk about an individual in a restaurant
who asked for ml Ire coffee. Our point is that it must be the case that to interpret this
sentence correct! {,the notions defining ham and sandwich are the same as the ones
used in the sentellce in (6).
(6) John ate ah 1msandwich.
The difference is that in (6), the referent in the discourse would have a rather direct
(and obvious) reation with the notions ham and sandwich (John would actually
have eaten a ham sandwich) whereas in the case of (5), the relation is defined with
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respect to a specific situation regarding an individual who ordered a ham sandwich
in a restaurant. The fact that in (5) we are lead to assume that what is talked about is
not the sandwich itself, but a person, depends on the context, both grammatical (the
use of a VP wants some more coffee) and extra grammatical (waiters talking in a
restaurant). But this does not lead us to assume that ham and sandwich correspond
to different notions in the two cases: the expression the ham sandwich in (5) cannot
be used to talk about someone who ordered a spinach quiche or an onion soup. The
terms ham and sandwich must relate to the same notions in both contexts. It is in
this sense that the association between the term and the concept is constant.
So, there is something constant about terms in all contexts, even in such an
extreme case, which is the association between the term and the notion, as opposed
to the details of the nature of the notion. The constant nature of this association
contrasts with the categorial values that the term red has in examples (1) and (2),
where the term can be interpreted either as an adjective or a noun. Given our as-
sumption about terminal description, we must conclude that this syntactic value is
nota property of the term. Significantly, the evocation of the notion RED remains
part of the interpretation even if the term's category is different.13 This observation
provides an interesting argument against an analysis of red based on homonymy.
The assumption that there are two words red in English, one an adjective and the
other a noun, is directly refuted by the observation that the term evokes the same
reality RED in both sentence. It must therefore be the same term, and to assume
homonymy is to ignore a significant empirical generalization.
If the syntactic category of the expression is not lexical, it must come from
somewhere else. Our contention is that the syntactic category is a function of how
the term is combined in the sentence.
4. SYNTACTIC CATEGORY AS A CONSTRUCTED NOTION
As we saw, red has different syntactic values in (1) and (2): the term can be inter-
preted either as an adjective or a noun. Under our view, this means that the category
cannot be a property of the term. We assume that the category of the term is the re-
13Ingeneral, contextual modulation of the notion RED is totally independent of the cate-
gory of the term, as the following contrasts show:
(i) a. They raised a red flag.
b. My skin is red.
c. A red agenda.
(ii) a. Mary favourite's hair colour is red.
b. The company is in the red.
c. For me, red is danger.
d. Reds. (American communists in the movie by that name)
e. The name of the team is in red.
Whereas the contextuallymodulated uses in (i) havea predicate/adjectivalvalue, similar con-
textually modulated uses in (ii) have a nominal value (either common noun or proper noun).
, ., ~';;
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sult of a formal It anipulation by the grammar. The term, as we suggested before, is
considered an "at Jm" in grammar by virtue of its indivisible nature. The hypothe-
sis is that morphllsyntax provides the means to alter a term's atomic value so that
it can relate to re alities that are not atomic. The rationale is that once an atom is
combined and pu in context, the resulting expression is not itself an atom: thus, it
becomes possible to assign non-atomic values to the term in the representation of
the complex expr ~ssions.
Let us c1arif) some assumptions we make about the different types of concep-
tual notions that 'ed relates to in its different uses in (1) and (2), repeated in (7)
and (8).
(7) a. A red ta ,Ie.
b. A bright red.
(8) a. Mary's j avouritecar is red.
b. Mary's j avouritecolour is red.
It seems that in tlese readings, red can distinguish three different types of notions
in the conceptual domain: when red is an adjective in (7a) and (8a), it relates to the
notion of propertl in the conceptual domain: it says something about a character-
istic of a specific object. In the case of (7b), where red is treated like a common
noun, the term f{ lates to a category in the cognitive domain, the expression im-
plies a category (f bright red. With the identity sentence (8b), red directly relates
to the individual r otion RED, and is treated as the name of a specific colour (Mary's
favourite one), m Jch like aproper noun.14
Although the three conceptual notions (property, category and individual) that
we assume here Ire likely a simplification of a more complex picture, they will
suffice to show t ow the basic grammatical value of atom might be modified to
relate to different conceptual notions.
To successfu Jy relate the value of atom to some of these notions will require
a modification of one of the basic characteristics of the atom. Let us assume that
aside from its ind ivisibility, an atom is also autonomous and unique. Again, these
values can be rellted to the notion of sign in the grammar. The term red, a free
morpheme, is aut )nomous in that when used on its own, outside of a proposition,
it still manages t( I identify the notion RED. The term is also unique: there is only
one expression nd that associates the form fled! to the notion RED. As we argue
below, these prolerties of the atom can be associated directly with the notion of
14Theidentity nature of the sentence (8b) is made clear by the fact that inverting the
subject and complement, as in (i), does not affect the grammaticality or truth-value of the
sentence.
(i) Red is Mary's favourite colour.
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individual. However, for the atom to relate to the notions of property and category,
either its autonomy or uniqueness will need to be altered.
When the term is used as an adjective, as in the examples in (7a) and (8a),
the atom must lose its autonomy: an adjective, the identifier of a property in a
sentence, is always in a relation of dependency with respect to something else,
the things it is a property of. Let us assume that a substantive atom becomes a
dependent element when it is included in another element in the representation of
a complex expression. Once an atom appears included in something else, it is then
no longer autonomous, but rather dependent on whatever it is included in. The two
cases illustrated in (7) and (8) represent inclusion in different elements. In (7a), the
denotation of red must be included in the atom table. In the case of (8a), the relation
of inclusion is mediated by the copula is.
Inclusion is obtained in the representation of a complex expression by a syn-
tactic rule: a term is included as it is combined. Whether inclusion can be obtained
directly, or some modification is required first, depends on the nature of the ele-
ment with which the term is to be combined. Consider for example the case of
table in (8a): being a term, table is an atom. As such, it has no "inside" within
which another atom could be included. Let us assume that an atom can be dupli-
cated if necessary to allow inclusion. We represent the operation "inclusion with
duplication" as in (9).
(9) xyx
~ Inclusion with duplication
y x
The effect of the syntactic combination is to duplicate the atom x in order to include
the atom y, which then becomes a part of x. We assume that when duplication
applies to include an atom, the result remains atomic in the sense that the two x's
are not understood as separate atoms, but as parts of the same atom. As we discuss
below, duplication can also separate atoms, in which case they relate to a set (or a
category).
The complex object xyx can be seen as the equivalent of a syntactic projection,
but is in fact a semantic representation. From two terms that have the same basic
value, syntax creates a representation of the combination where the atom y has
a new value, the value we associate, by hypothesis, with the category adjective.
Assuming that the expression red table in (7a) is combined by the rule in (9), we
obtain the representation in (10) (where the atom is represented by the first letter of
the notion it denotes).
(i0) TRT
~
R T
red table
This means that the atom R is included inside the duplicated T. In the representa-
tion, the denotation of red is then dependant on the denotation of table: this config-
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uration correspon js to the adjectival interpretation of red. IS
In the copula r construction (8a), the included atom does not relate directly to
the atom that includes it. Instead the relation is mediated by the copula be: the in-
cluded term is thu s interpreted as a property of the argument of the copula. Follow-
ing Lamarche (2C03a), we assume that the function of be is to provide a temporal
slice by which it is possible to locate one piece of information in the discourse.
Formally, this is 'epresented by the brackets in (11), which delimit the temporal
boundaries occup ied by the piece of information in the discourse.
(11) be: ( )
Given that be is c region, as opposed to an atom, it is possible to directly include
material in it. Th'ls, the expression is red, where red is included, has the represen-
tation in (12).
(12) (R)
~ ~ simple inclusion
( ) R
is red
The expression rt d is then interpreted as a dependant of whatever the argument of
be is.
For our curre rltpurposes, it is sufficient to assume that the argument of a tensed
verb is necessarilJ the subject, if the subject is not an expletive. Simplifying some-
what, we assume that there is a rule-call it identification of the subject-that
turns the subject i!lto the argument of the element that bears the tense marker. Rep-
resenting the tens ~marker by the subscript Tin (13), we assume that an expression
that is stacked above the functor that bears this marker is interpreted as the argu-
ment located by t Ie verb is:
(13) x
( IT
~~
X ( )T
x is
If red is combinel Iwith is by inclusion prior to the identification of the subject, then
we would get the representation in (14) for the expression x is red:
(14) x
(Rh
In this representa ion, the atom is interpreted as something that is about the subject
x. Just as in (7a), Ihen, the atom R in (8a) is included in something: this, we assume,
ISBecause it wo lid take us beyond the issue of relating an atom to different conceptual
notions, we leave a! ide the question of what determines the order of the terms (which is to be
included, and whicl, is to be duplicated). We assume that this issue relates to the grammatical
number parameter Iliscussed in Bouchard (2002).
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is an adjectival interpretation of a term. The difference between (7a) and (8a) lies
in the fact that the inclusion is mediated by a tensed verb in (14), whereas in (10) it
directly characterizes the element denoted by the expression table.
We should point out that the presence of the complement red in (14) is not
assumed to be dependant on selectional properties of be. We do not assume that be
requires a complement. Indeed, we must not assume that be requires a complement
because it can appear without one in its existence use (for example, to be or not to
be or I think, therefore I am). Under our basic assumption that what is attributed to
a lexical item must be constant across all uses of the term, the existence use tells us
that the presence of a complement with be is not the reflection of lexical specifica-
tion. Instead, we assume that the complement with be is a free element: its presence
depends on what the speaker wants to convey about the piece of information that is
located in the discourse by be. The syntactic category value of the complement is
not restricted by the verb's lexical description in the grammar, but by the rules that
are available in syntax to combine complements.
Let us now consider the use of red in (8b). Given that red in (8b) does not have
the adjectival value it has in (8a), we have to assume that there is another rule of
combination available in English to combine a complement. This rule, we assume,
combines a functor to its argument. In (8b), the sentence has an identity reading
akin to the one in (15).
(15) Clark Kent is Superman
In this case, the complement is taken to have the same value as the subject of the
sentence: it is thus an argument. Our position is that this value arises from a rule
of identification. Let us assume that there is a rule of default identification, which
formally stacks the content of an expression below the functor that it combines
with.
(16) ( )
x
(~ x
default identification
In English, default identification is done from left to right (the functor takes its
argument to its right). Assuming that both identification and inclusion are available
in English, it becomes possible to combine the complement of be in two different
ways, yielding two possible values for the complement.
Let us now return to the fact that the complement in (15) is a proper noun.
Proper nouns, the rigid designators of Kripke (1971), denote individuals. If we as-
sume, quite reasonably, that an individual is indivisible, autonomous and unique,
then an atom should be able to relate directly to an individual given its indivisibility,
autonomy and uniqueness. Thus, no formal manipulation is required to get an indi-
vidual reading out of an atomic term. The atom used as a proper noun can thus be
combined directly - without any formal alteration - by identification. Sentence
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(17)
(15) receives the representation in (17) (for the sake of simplicity, we are treating
Clark Kent as an atom here).
:K
)T
S
~~
CK ( )T
Clark Kent S
~
T )T S
is Superman
We argue in Lan tarche (2003a) that the identity reading of such sentences arises
from the fact thai be introduces a single piece of information in the sentence. That
two distinct aton s relate to this single piece of information means that their deno-
tations must,. at Sl )me level, be about the same thing.
Having said that the value of the complement of be is a function of what com-
bination operatio ns are available, when two operations are available to combine a
complement, we ~xpect an expression like x is red to be associated with two repre-
sentations, as in (18).
(18) a. x
(R)T
b. x
( )T
R
Example (18a) is the one associated with a copular construction where red has an
adjectival value, i.e., (8a), where red is combined by inclusion. (18b) is the repre-
sentation associaed with a identity value, i.e., (8b), where the rule of identification
is used to combi ne red. Before discussing how to relate these representations to
sentences and tn th-values, we need to complete this discussion and tackle the use
of red as a comn on noun of (7b).
In this case, we assumed that red identifies a category. If we assume that a
category, by defi!Lition,relates not to an atom but to a set of objects, the uniqueness
of the atom must be altered to allow it to relate to a category. We already have an
operation that duplicates an atom (rule (9». We now want to duplicate the atom so
that it creates ato]os that are separate from one another. The function of grammatical
number can be ir terpreted as doing just that: it takes an atom and duplicates it into
separated atoms. The plural of cats could thus be represented as in (19), where the
function of the fl.:xional element s not only duplicates but also separates the atom.
(19) C C
Let us assume that unless there are explicit boundaries added to a representation,
the two atoms se larated by a space in (19) identify an infinite set of atoms.
The indefinie article can also identify a category of things. Let us assume that
the indefinite art:de is a functor that defines a region that is wider that one atom,
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but narrower than two, from within a set of atoms. Let us represent this region by
curly brackets in (20).
(20) a: I
An atom is combined with this functor by duplication and inclusion, with the func-
tor appearing inside the duplicated atom in the result, as in (21).
(21) xl Ix
~
I I x
a x
Because the functor identifies a region that is wider than an atom, the duplicated
atoms are necessarily separated from one another: they therefore cannot be under-
stood as part of the same atom, but instead form a set. Let us assume a rule of
interpretation such as the following:
(22) In an ordered sequence a, b, c where a, b, and c are separated atoms,
if a and care xs, then b is also an x
With this, we ensure that an element included inside the set of bracket will be an
element that is also a member of the same set of things to which the duplicated
atoms belong. For example, if we assume that the verb be can be included in the
space defllled by the expression a cat, and then identified by a subject that denotes
an individual, we get the representation in (23) for the sentence Puzzle is a cat.
(23) P
C{( hlC
This means that the atom Puzzle belongs to the set of atoms cats.
Returning to the case of red, we then get the representation in (24) for the
expression a bright red in (7b).
(24) RBR I IRBR
~
I RBR
a ~
B R
bright red
The term red is first duplicated in order to include bright, giving the complex notion
bright red; at this level, although red is no longer an atom, the whole expression
still has the status of an atom because it has not been duplicated and separated.
Separation occurs once bright red is combined with the determiner a, to create
the set of bright reds. This representation could then be used to identify a single
member of that set (as in this is a bright red).
Although more could be said about most of the hypotheses just outlined-
how to formalize the rules, how to apply them to describe other phenomena, how
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(25) a. xRx }xRx
(26) a. x
(R)T
to constrain thel n- their purpose here is to illustrate how an atomic value can be
manipulated so that it can relate to the interpretations of red in (7) and (8). The
relevant aspects of these representations appear in (25) and (26).
b. RxR{ }RxR
b. x
( )T
R
The adjectival interpretations in (7a) and (8a) are accounted for by assuming that
the atom is no lllllger autonomous, but is instead included in another element (the
argument x ofth~ indefinite determiner in (25a) for (7a), and the copula in (26a) for
(8a». The comnon noun interpretation of (7b) is represented in (25b), where the
atom is duplical ed and separated as it is combined with the indefinite article. Fi-
nally, the proper noun interpretation of (8b), shown in (26b), follows from the com-
bination of be b) identification, as its indivisible, autonomous, and unique character
is sufficient to j( entity a specific colour.
These repre sentations are constructed independently of the denotation of the
term red: in fact. the atom R could be replaced by a variable in the representations
in (25) and (26), without affecting the essence of the analysis. The denotation of red
is only significaJ It to the assessment of whether the value assigned to the expression
by syntax can re ;eive a truth-value. We turn to this issue in the next section.
5. TRUTH-VAL UE AND GRAMMATICAL SEMANTICS
In the analysis just sketched, morphosyntax is a mechanism that builds different
semantic configllfations~such as the oneS in (25) and (26)-which can then be
related to differe nt types of notions in the conceptual domain. These configurations
are constructed without any reference to the denotation of the term. The denota-
tion serves only to determine whether an interpretation in syntax is possible given
the nature of thl: context where the expression is placed. Let us address the role
in the analysis c f the conceptual domain - where the denotation of the terms are
defined - by fir;t discussing the different interpretations of the copular sentences
in (8), and then elaborating on the interaction of grammatical semantics with this
domain.
The sentenc es in (8) are superficially similar, but have ditferent readings. Un-
der our view, thf difference in reading is not related to the nature of the denotation
of red, but depel.ds on the use of different rules of syntax to combine the term with
the verb. In (8a:, red is combined with the verb by inclusion to yield something
like (26a), an ad. ectival reading, whereas in (8b), red is combined by identification
to yield (26b), a proper noun reading. The obvious question is why does it have
to be that way? What would prevent the construction of the representation (26b)
for sentence (8a t, or the construction of the representation (26a) for (8b)? Within
the system of ru]es outlined previously, nothing in the combinatorial system would
prevent these as~ociations. The problem with these associations lies in the mapping
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of the representations to the conceptual domain: such representations would not,
under normal circumstances, yield truth-values.
The nature of the conceptual notion evoked by the head noun in subject posi-
tion, car in (8a) and colour in (8a) determines whether a given mapping will yield
a truth- value. Car denotes a category of things that have a visual reality and red de-
notes a property of objects in the visual field, so a representation like (26a) would
yield a truth-value. On the other hand, red in (8b) cannot be combined as an adjec-
tive because the result would not receive a truth-value. In this sentence, the head of
the subject, colour, evokes the set of notions to which RED belongs. The subject, on
the other hand, distinguishes a single member of that set (Mary's favourite one), so
combining red as a predicate would not yield a truth value: the subject here cannot
be construed as something that has the property RED, because it identifies a specific
member of the set of notions to which RED belongs. The only way to combine red
that will yield a truth-value in this context is to treat it as a proper noun, as in (26b):
it then identifies the specific colour that is said to be Mary's favourite one. Notice
that we then have a unified description for red: it has a unique relation to a certain
reality in the cognitive domain. Furthermore, the denotation itself is never altered
by syntax. For example, red in all the readings discussed above always evokes the
same notion RED.
This analysis, then, ultimately relies on the capacity to uncover the nature of
the organization of the conceptual domain, for example, establishing the type of
relation the notions RED, COLOUR and CAR have with one another in that domain.
Truth-values of propositions are thus rooted in the conceptual domain. In this sense,
the analysis might appear similar to approaches where interpretation is based on a
model-theoretic world, or where grammatical categories are cognitive prototypes.
Notice, however, that we are not arguing that the conceptual domain plays no role
in interpretation, we are questioning the level of grammatical analysis to which this
domain relates. In standard approaches, whether formal or functional, the notions
of the conceptual domain are used to describe the terms (Borer, 2005, is an excep-
tion). In our approach, the role of the conceptual domain at the terminal level is
strictly to distinguish atoms from one another. The actual value of a denotation in
the conceptual domain is only used at the output of syntax, once elements have been
combined. In effect, our syntax constructs representations totally independently of
the nature of the denotation of terms, and is thus truly a 'formal' system: itcre-
ates representations (or logical formulas) that only have a reality at the level of the
form, independently of conceptual meaning. The constructed representations, how-
ever, are made to relate to the conceptual domain: the role of syntax is to create
distinctions that can be mapped to conceptual notions.
Given that grammatical representations are constructed to formalize relations
in the conceptual domain, they should provide a tool to discover how this domain
is organized. Let us look first at the building blocks of grammatical representation,
atoms. An atom is a formal object that can isolate notions that are not easily iso-
latable (properties, sets, functions, etc). Even a fuzzy notion like a colour can be
L.'
113
LINGUISTICA ArLANTICA No. 25, 2004
isolated into an atom (a word). The distribution of a word in a grammatical context
should also tell l S something about the notion with which the word is associated.
For example, let IS suppose that RED, fundamentally, is a property in the cognitive
domain: this accimnts for its capacity to appear as an adjective, where it is under-
stood in relation to something else. But the fact that red can also appear as a noun
indicates that thi:; notion can be individualized independently of the nature of any
object (think of tile little cards available at paint stores). The possibility of nominal-
ization is thus an overt manifestation of the possibility of individualizing the notion
in the conceptual domain. Compare this to the case of the expression small, which
denotes a size. A size is a relative notion and its value is directly dependent on the
type of object it Ielates to (a small elephant is bigger than a big butterfly). It is thus
an expression th~t will require something to relate to and will have the tendency to
be used in an adjectival context. This does not necessarily preclude the use of the
notion in a 'nominal' way, but a special context might be required. Examples like
small is beautifu', or the tautology small is small are such contexts. On the other
hand, in an envir, mment were small relates to a category (a small or smalls), then it
tends to be used' ¥ith a specific and more conventionalized interpretation (a size of
clothing). In that same context, red poses no problems (a red or reds) since it can
be individualizec quite easily.
To say more about issues related to adjectival modification would take us be-
yond the current scope of this paper. See Bouchard (2002), and references therein
for a recent disc ussion. The implications of the discussion, however, should be
clear: a theory 0 f grammar that is based on the sort of approach proposed here
should provide ir sight into the nature of the conceptual domain.
We should c ose this section with the observation that an adequate understand-
ing of the relatio [\ship between the conceptual and grammatical domains will un-
doubtedly requir,: looking at more that one language, because different languages
use different mo'phological and syntactic means to identify seemingly identical
concepts. Under our view, we expect the cross-linguistic differences to be moti-
vated by differen ces in the functional systems of languages. Functional content is
in a sense the fo rmal support provided by grammar for the construction of logi-
cal formulas. If t le pieces of functional content differ from language to language,
then we would e:~pect differences in the means used to express similar conceptual
denotations from language to language.
The architecture we just described follows directly from the requirement that
terminal descriptions be constant. Taking this requirement as primary leads to the
seeking of anSWfrs in the combinational system of grammar for issues that would
otherwise be con ;idered strictly lexical. The last section of this paper discusses the
significance of th is consequence.
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6. SYNTAX OUT OF THE LEXICON, CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE OUT OF
GRAMMAR
The approach to form-meaning relations sketched here leads to a leaner grammat-
ical theory than approaches that describe terms using non-terminal properties, that
is, properties of terms that are not constant across contexts. We address in this sec-
tion two issues that highlight the cost in complexity for a theory that uses such
properties to describe terms.
The first issue relates to the cost that results from the use of syntactic notions at
the terminal level. As we have said throughout this paper, form- meaning relations at
the terminal level cannot be derived from anything because they are arbitrary. They
must be learned and thus have an intrinsic cost. In contrast, form-meaning relations
at the level of constructions should be derivable, because their number is potentially
infinite, and it is thus impossible to learn them all. Given that terms can appear in
an infinite number of constructions, any mention in the description of a term of a
property that is only true of some constructions where the term appears will require
additional statements to account for the term's interpretation in constructions where
it does not exhibit that property. For example, if the value adjective is assigned as a
terminal property of red, then some extra statement will be required to account for
the other values that red has in contexts.
Lexical homonymy is one example of an additional statement that is required
because a property of a construction is used to describe a term. Type-shifting rules
are another type of statement used to account for the change in categorial value of
expressions (see Partee 1987 for an overview of type-shifting principles). Although
these rules appear to be more motivated than straight homonymy because they ap-
ply in the syntax (instead of the lexicon), the fact remains that the very need to
postulate these rules arises from the assumption that terms have a type to start with.
Furthermore, stating the type at the terminal level is a cost in itself. For example,
a term like red then requires two associations-one with a conceptual marker, as
assumed here, and another with a type.
If a terminal description must be constant across contexts, type cannot be a
property of terms. It therefore has no existence at the terminal level, and only
emerges as the result of syntactic combination. Consequently, the same term can
appear with two interpretations without alteration of its basic content. Moreover,
no matter how syntactic categories are defined (the binary features in Chomsky
1970 or Jackendoff 1977, the prototypes in Croft 1991, the syntactic definition pro-
posed in Baker 2003, etc.), a theory that assumes their existence at the terminal
level necessarily requires more statements than one in which these categories are
built up by the syntactic component.
The second issue that is significant for the complexity of the theory relates to
the "division of labour" between grammar and conceptual knowledge. It seems in-
escapable that conceptual knowledge is inherently complex, and must include an
intricate web of associations that allow human beings to recognize perhaps millions
.,
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of distinctions. (]early, these associations are stored somewhere in the brain. In
our approach, thi s information has no relevance for the construction of meaning in
grammar. Indivicual parts of conceptual knowledge are associated with individual
linguistic forms:!t the terminal level. But these associations are all formally identi-
cal- grammar tl'eats them as atoms - and the inherent complexity of the concepts
has no bearing Oil the computation of the logical formulas at the level of the propo-
sition. Informati.m about concepts is only solicited to determine truth-value once
terms have been ;ombined in a grammatical structure.
In contrast, t le complexity of conceptual knowledge becomes directly included
in grammar whe n descriptions are not terminal. A discussion of type/categorial
value in formal ~emantics illustrates this consequence. Formal semantics assumes
a principled sepa ration between conceptual knowledge and the formal system that
is relevant for the logical interpretation of sentences. The type value of terms is one
way this separati)n is established. As Partee (1980:62) points out:
a semantic interpretation rule for [constructions with a common noun
and an aU:ibutive adjective or a relative clause] makes predictions
about an i I1finite class of expressions, and these predictions can be
tested for i :orrectness and with respect to truth conditions and entail-
ment relati ons without the need to consider anything of the semantic
content ofi larticular lexical items besides their logical type. (emphasis
mine)
But we would a;k the question: why is a given type value assigned to a given
term? For examp Ie, why would red be considered a predicate, as opposed to sayan
individual consta nt? It seems to us that the answer lies in the nature of the reality
denoted by these terms, that is, the nature of the concept that they identify: red
denotes somethillg that is conceptualized as a property in the visual field. If this
is so, then the jllstification for the logical type in formal semantics is in fact a
property of the concept itself. And as we have argued here, distinctive properties
of concepts do nllt belong to the term, or to the domain of grammar. If this view is
correct, the model used in formal semantics for natural language is flawed, since it
uses properties tl tat exist outside of grammar to determine the selection of logical
relations inside grammar.
Using non-t'lrminal properties thus blurs the division between grammatical
knowledge and conceptual knowledge, because it leads to the importing into the
grammatical sysl ~m of information that, under our view, has no relevance for lin-
guistics (this eel oes Bouchard's claim [1995] that linguistic theory is generally
based on the wn mg type of semantics). As a result, the grammatical lexicon be-
comes much mOle than a list ofform-meaning associations. As Pustejovsky's Gen-
erative Lexicon illustrates (1995), such a lexicon contains complex webs of infor-
mation that, unde r our view, belong to general cognition but not to linguistics.
This perspe<live is similar in spirit to that proposed in Borer (2005). Thus,
Borer writes thai "properties of substantive vocabulary ... are creatures born of
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perception and conceptualization" and are "thus fundamentally not grammatical"
(p. 7).16 She assumes that meaning in grammar is a matter of linguistic structure.
For her, grammatical semantics and substantive content are compared in "a place
which is neither the grammar nor the conceptual system, call it the 'making sense'
component" (p. 8), where a felicitous linguistic result is dependent on the degree to
which the two types of meaning can be matched with one another.
At this general level, there is thus a clear resemblance to what we propose here.
The difference between the two approaches lies in the grammatical system itself,
and more specifically, in how "grammatical meaning" is defined and formalized.
Under our view, meaning is a function of composition, so that semantic values
have no reality at the level of the term. Consider the difference between the two
constructions in (27), where an x assumed to be a substantive term is combined
with the content we attributed to be above: 17
(27) a. ( )
x
(~
b. (x)
(~ x
The x in (27a), because it is combined by identification, is interpreted as a proper
noun, or the name of an individual; in (27b), where x is combined with be by inclu-
sion, x is interpreted as an adjective. The distinction is not expressed at the terminal
level (the x in (27) has no value) but at the level of the combination (or, to put it dif-
ferently, at the level of the syntactic projection). Thus, the different values that can
be attributed to the term x only exist at the level of the complex expressions. There
is no symbol associated with these distinctions at the terminal level of grammar.
In Borer's approach, much of the structural meaning comes from a complex
functional structure - which is in part abstract- that is ultimately rooted in spec-
ifications located in terminal nodes of the structure. In other words, even if the
conceptual notions associated with a term have no bearing on its categorial value
in the sentence, complexity remains at the terminal level of the analysis in the form
of functional specification. The issue can be more easily illustrated by discussing
Marantz's (2000) suggestion that the categorial value of a root (the element that
16The page numbers for the citations are those from the unpublished manuscript, "Struc-
turing sense", which was available at www-ref . use. edu/ - borer / download. html
before the book was actually published.
17A third value - mass noun - can be associated with the bare singular noun in English.
In Lamarche (2003b), we account for this fact by assuming that mass interpretation results
from combining the node where grammatical number appears (the head noun in English)
with what is the equivalent of an argument position (the content of be, for example) by
inclusion with duplication, as in (21). This yields a representation like the one in (i).
(i) x( )x
What the argument position locates in the discourse in (i) is only a subpart of something
wider, hence the impression that it is unbound.
f::l~;:.':.
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denotes a concep :ual notion) is dependent on a functional node 'small n' or 'small
a' that would tak.: the term as its complement. 18The grammatical value of the term
is then independt nt of its conceptual denotation, and a given root can appear with
different values independently of its denotation. This system still associates the
grammatical value to a terminal node of the analysis: it requires a separate notion
of adjective and noun somewhere prior to syntactic combination. Thus a distinction
that, in our syster 1, is constructed (the distinction between adjective and noun) still
has a reality at the terminal level in both Marantz's and Borer's systems. In this
sense, the idea tt at linguistic meaning is a function of combinational operations,
and not terminal descriptions, is not truly respected, and the cost associated with
the terminal desc'iption, which in principle cannot be derived, would thus remain.
7. CONCLuswr I
We have argued f)r a view of the correspondence between form and meaning based
on the assumptio 1 that terminal descriptions must be independent of context, that
is, they must be (onstant across contexts. This assumption, we believe, is a funda-
mental requireml:TIt of any linguistic theory that seeks to explain how a grammar
can generate a p(ltentially infinite number of possible form-meaning relations out
of a finite numbe' of arbitrary form-meaning associations.
Under this v ew, a significant part of the lexicon (the substantive part, exclud-
ing functional co ltent) is simply a list of constant relations between a form and a
conceptual notiml. The complexity associated with the conceptual distinctions has
no relevance for grammatical analysis: as far as grammar is concerned, only the
association with the concept is relevant. This relation defines the notion of atom
in the grammar. 'rhe lexicon that emerges is thus optimal, because it is based on
a unique association between a form and a conceptual meaning. All semantic dis-
tinctions that are significant for linguistic form are a function of combination, and
thus only exist at the output of syntax.
Although th. :se consequences have been illustrated through a single example
that highlights a (ategorial distinction, the general reasoning applies to a wide range
of linguistic facts, The implications of this conclusion are profound. If the position
advocated here i~ correct, it raises a multitude of new problems for linguistic the-
ory, because just about every distinction used to describe terms in contemporary
linguistic theorie; is not terminal in the sense implied here. In some cases, these
distinctions do n)t belong to linguistic analysis but to conceptual knowledge; in
others, the distinctions do belong in the grammar, but need to emerge as a result of
rules of combinal ion as opposed to being listed in the lexicon. The challenge is thus
to imagine a forn lal system in which what has long been taken as basic is actually
derived.
18Marantz (2001)) is an unpublished manuscript cited in Baker (2003). Although fairly
different in many respects, his analysis shares Borer's perspective that syntactic category
value is dependant on the functional structure in which a root is inserted.
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